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WHO DEFERS TO WHOM? THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL TARGETS OREGON'S DEATH WITH
DIGNITY ACT
Joseph Cordaro'
"[A] State cannot, by its unilateralaction, take its physicians' conduct
out of the scope of otherwise nationally applicable prohibitions on the
dispensing of controlled substances."
-U.S. Department of Justice'
"You don't hearme complainingabout Oregon's law."
-Justice Antonin Scalia 2
INTRODUCTION

In 1986, Peggy Sutherland was diagnosed with lung cancer For
fourteen years she fought back courageously, but in 2000 the cancer
launched a painful, and decisive, attack against the bones of the sixtyeight-year-old Oregon resident.4
After three major surgeries,5
chemotherapy, and implantation of a device that pumped painkillers
into her spinal fluid, Peggy's life became one of constant pain and
incapacity, and her sickbed defined the physical limits of her world.'
In most states, Peggy would have been forced to endure constant
agony as the cancer advanced to its inevitable victory.! Oregon,
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I wish to thank Professor
Matthew Diller, Professor James E. Fleming, and Professor Abner S. Greene for their
insights; my family for always being there; my friends at Fordham for their support;
and, most especially, my wife Georgetta for her unending patience, understanding,
and love.
1. Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice to John
Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States 16 (June 27, 2001) (on file with
FordhamLaw Review) [hereinafter OLC Memorandum].
2. Sam Howe Verhovek, Government and Oregon Vie over Doctor-Aided
Suicide, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23,2002, at All.
3. Carol M. Ostrom, Ore. Suicides Steady, Still Sharply Divisive, Seattle Times,
Feb. 10, 2002, at B1.
4. Susan Okie, 'I Should Die the Way I Want To,'Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al.
5. Ostrom, supra note 3.
6. Okie, supra note 4. Peggy's symptoms also included breathing difficulties and
periodic coughing up of blood. Id.
7. Thirty-six states and territories explicitly prohibit the assistance or promotion
of suicide; three states have homicide statutes that would encompass physician-
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however, is not "most states." Since 1999, Oregon law has permitted
residents to use the ultimate weapon against the final assault of a
terminal disease: physician-assisted suicide.' Under the provisions of
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act,9 competent Oregonians who are
terminally ill'0 may request medication for the purpose of ending their
lives "in a humane and dignified manner.''"
Late in 2000, Peggy informed her physician that she wanted to take
advantage of the Death with Dignity Act. 2 After the mandatory
fifteen-day waiting period, Peggy's daughter Julie McMurchie picked
up a prescription for secobarbital, which was the most commonly-used
medication for this purpose at the time. 3 On January 25, 2001,
Peggy's family gathered in her bedroom and together read the
Twenty-Third Psalm. 4
When they finished, Peggy drank the
medication. 15 Julie later remembered, "I think within five minutes she
was asleep. Within 20, she passed away.... I think she loved her five
children an awful lot and wanted to leave them something. After just
an awful, wretched several months... we were given a gift that
morning."6
Under the Model Penal Code and most state statutes, such gifts are
prohibited, and Peggy's physician would have been powerless to grant

assisted suicide; six states and the District of Columbia, in absence of such laws, have
condemned the practice; and Maryland's Attorney General equates physician-assisted
suicide with crimes constituting reckless endangerment. See Christine Neylon O'Brien
& Gerald A. Madek, Physician-AssistedSuicide: New Protocolfor a Rightful Death,
77 Neb. L. Rev. 229, 275-76 (1998). For a listing of the various state statutes, see id. at
275 nn.314-17.
8. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.805 (2001) (permitting residents suffering from
terminal illnesses to commit suicide with the assistance of a physician). On March 7,
2002, the Hawaii House of Representatives approved two bills that would make
Hawaii the second state to permit physician-assisted suicide, but these bills face
potential opposition in the Hawaii Senate. Assisted Suicide Measures Gain, L.A.
Times, Mar. 8, 2002, at A42.
9. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800-127.897.
10. For the purposes of the statute, patients must be suffering from "terminal
disease," which is defined as "incurable and irreversible disease that has been
medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death
within six months." Id. § 127.800(12).
11. Id. § 127.805.
12. Okie, supra note 4.
13. Id. In May 2001, pharmaceutical corporation Eli Lilly stopped producing
secobarbital. Or. Dep't of Human Services, Fourth Annual Report on Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act 10 (2002), available at http:llwww.ohd.hr.state.or.us/chs/pas/
Olpasrpt.pdf [hereinafter Fourth Annual Report]. Patients who did not ingest
secobarbital in 2001 ingested pentobarbital. Id.
14. Okie, supra note 4. The Twenty-Third Psalm begins: "The Lord is my
shepherd; I shall not want." Psalms 23.
15. Okie, supra note 4. Patients sometimes take a shot of brandy after ingesting
the medication. See Timothy Egan, First Death Under an Assisted-Suicide Law, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 26, 1998, at A14.
16. Okie, supra note 4 (second alteration in original).
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her request for the medication necessary to end her suffering." Since
June 1998, Congressional opponents of assisted suicide have
attempted,.with little success, to bring Oregon into line with the Code
and these other states. 8 In November 2001, with matters apparently
stalled indefinitely on Capitol Hill, the United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ") leapt into the crusade against the Death with Dignity
Act. 9 In an interpretive rule dated November 6, 2001, Attorney
General John Ashcroft determined that physician-assisted suicide was
not a "legitimate medical purpose" under Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") regulation 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a), and that
the prescribing or administering of controlled substances for the
purpose of assisting suicide was therefore "inconsistent with the public
interest" under the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA")."
Accordingly, Ashcroft directed the DEA Administrator Asa
Hutchinson to implement this determination, which reversed former
Attorney General Janet Reno's permissive approach toward the

Death with Dignity Act,2 1 by subjecting non-compliant physicians to
possible suspension or revocation of their licenses.?' The Oregon
Department of Justice immediately sought a temporary restraining
order, which United States District Judge Robert E. Jones granted.

On April 17, 2002, Judge Jones issued a permanent injunction
preventing the DOJ "from enforcing, applying, or otherwise giving
any legal effect to the Ashcroft directive."2'4

17. Model Penal Code § 210.5(2) (1980); see supra note 7.
18. See Joy Fallek, Note, The Pain Relief Promotion Act: Will it Spell Death to
"Death with Dignity" or Is It Unconstitutional?, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1739, 1746-58
(2000) (describing the failed Lethal Drug Abuse and Prevention Act of 1998 and the
now-delayed Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 85-89.
20. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001); see 21 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2000) (granting the Attorney General
power to suspend or revoke the licenses of physicians for, inter alia, actions
"inconsistent with the public interest").
21. See Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, to Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (June 5,
1998), available at http'J/vww.house.gov/judiciary/attygen.htm (hereinafter Reno
Letter] (concluding that "the CSA does not authorize DEA to prosecute, or to revoke
the DEA registration of, a physician who has assisted in a suicide in compliance with
Oregon law").
22. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608.
23. Oregon v. Ashcroft, No. 01-1647 (D. Or. Nov. 8, 2001). available at
http://wvww.dwd.org/pdf/transcript.pdf.
24. Oregon v. Ashcroft, No. 01-1647-JO, slip op. at 5 (D. Or. Apr. 17, 2002).
Judge Jones's thirty-page opinion focused on the language of the CSA, the legislative
history of the statute, and the lack of precedential support for prosecuting a physician
under the CSA for actions in compliance with state law. Id. at 19-26. While
acknowledging the existence of the administrative law issues discussed in this Note,
Judge Jones declined to resolve the case as an administrative matter and instead held
that the DOJ interpretive rule "exceeds the authority delegated to the defendants
[the DOJ] under the CSA." Id. at 14.
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Should the DOJ decide to appeal, a key battleground in the
litigation will be whether the reviewing court should defer to
Ashcroft's interpretation of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04, which in turn
interprets the CSA. This Note will examine this issue from an
administrative law standpoint. Part I, Section A will explain the
important provisions of the Death with Dignity Act and the uneasy
relationship between the Act and the federal government.
Specifically, the section will explore the failed equal protection
challenge to the Act;25 Attorney General Janet Reno's refusal to
enforce the CSA against Oregon doctors who assisted suicides; 26 the
fight against the Act in the Congress;27 and, finally, the Ashcroft
directive that reversed Ms. Reno's ruling.'
Part I, Section B examines the legal background against which this
battle likely will play out. The section begins with an examination of
two very important federal statutes, one obviously implicated in the
controversy, and one perhaps not so obviously implicated, but just as
important: the CSA 29 and the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA")3 °
The section surveys the Supreme Court's key
administrative procedure decisions in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources
Defense Council, Inc.'3 1 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co.,32 Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,33 and recent cases building on these
important decisions.'
This survey of rulemaking decisions also
includes an explanation of the avoidance canon of statutory
construction, which dictates that courts, where possible, interpret
statutes in a manner that avoids constitutional conflict, unless there is
clear congressional intent to the contrary.35 The section concludes
with a brief survey of the Supreme Court cases that have assessed the
so-called "right to die" and the roles that the federal and state
governments have to play in determining this right.36
With Part I of this Note having outlined the historical and legal
background of the controversy, Part II focuses on the likely arguments
for both sides on the issue of whether the Attorney General's order to
the DEA is entitled to judicial deference. Section A explores the
argument that the DOJ directive is not entitled to judicial deference.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra text accompanying
See Reno Letter, supra note
See infra text accompanying
See infra text accompanying
See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.a.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
325 U.S. 410 (1945).

notes 56-60.
21; infra text accompanying note 68.
notes 70-80.
notes 85-89.

33. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
34. Two recent Supreme Court decisions are of particular importance:
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
(1997). See infra Part I.B.2.ii-iv.
35. See infra Part I.B.3.
36. See infra Part I.B.4.
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At the heart of this argument is Christensen v. Harris County, in
which the Supreme Court refused to defer to an agency's
interpretation of a statute because, like the directive at issue here, the
interpretation was not the product of formal adjudication or noticeand-comment rulemaking.-s The argument continues by offering that
the proper means for reviewing the directive is Skidmore analysis, in
which the court assesses, among other things, the consistency of the
interpretation with prior interpretations and the expertise of the
promulgating agency.3 9

Section B, by contrast, focuses on DOJ's contention that physicianassisted suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose" under 21 C.F.R.
§ 1306.04 and therefore runs afoul of the CSA. The section then
examines the argument that judicial deference to DOJ's interpretation
of the regulation is appropriate under the Supreme Court's decision in
Auer v. Robbins,' in which the Court deferred to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulation." The DOJ interpretive rule,
itself an interpretation of a regulation promulgated by the DEA, one
of its own agencies, fits into this schema. 2
Part IUl engages these arguments and contends first that automatic
deference under Seminole Rock should not apply to administrative
interpretations of regulations that do not arise out of formal
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. 3 Courts, therefore,
should apply Skidmore to these interpretations, thereby assuring that
an agency's informal interpretations of regulations and statutes are
subject to a closer judicial scrutiny than formal interpretations."' The
part argues further that application of Skidmore analysis to the DOJ
interpretive rule should result in scant, if any, respect for its reading of
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 and the CSA because the interpretation reverses
prior DOJ policy and the promulgating agency lacks expertise in the
field at issue (medicine). In addition, under the avoidance canon, the
courts should not permit the DOJ to construe the CSA in a way that
overturns state legislation, thereby leading to potentially serious
federalism issues. 4 Therefore, even if the DOJ interpretative rule
37. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
38. Id. at 587.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 213-20.
40. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
41. Id. at 461. The agency interpretation at issue in Auer was the Secretary of
Labor's reading of 21 C.F.R. § 541.118(a). Auer, 519 U.S. at 455.
42- See infra Part II.B.
43. See infra Part III.A.
44. See infra Part III.B.2.
45. This tool of statutory construction is sometimes known as the avoidance
canon. Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759, 835 (1997); see William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 599 (1992) (calling the avoidance
canon "[p]robably the most important of the constitutionally based canons"). The
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were eligible for some form of deference, the courts should prefer the
interpretation of the statute epitomized by the hands-off approach of
Attorney General Reno, who refused to apply the CSA to Oregon
physicians
who assisted suicides in compliance with the laws of their
46

state.
This Note concludes that the proper interpretation of 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04 with respect to physician-assisted suicide is that of Attorney

General Reno in 1998. Because Attorney General Ashcroft's
interpretation lacks persuasiveness under Skidmore and implicates
potential constitutional questions, the court should revert to the Reno

view that the DOJ may not use either 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 or the CSA
to punish physicians who assist suicides in compliance with Oregon
law.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND THE STATE OF OREGON

The present incarnation of the Death with Dignity Act is the
product of a four-year gestation period.4 7 As currently codified, the
Act provides the following:
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to
be suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily
expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for
medication for the48purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner.

general philosophy behind the canon, a "cardinal principle" in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, is that, in the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary, the
courts should decline an otherwise acceptable interpretation of a statute if that
interpretation leads to constitutional problems and instead construe the statute in a
manner that avoids these problems. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see infra Part III.B.3.
46. See Reno Letter, supra note 21.
47. See Fallek, supra note 18, at 1740-43.
48. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.805(1) (2001). The Death with Dignity Act contains a
number of procedural safeguards to prevent potential misuse or abuse. See Fallek,
supra note 18, at 1743. In addition to the limitation that patients must be suffering
from a "terminal disease," see supra note 10, age or disability may not be the sole
qualifications for utilization of the Death with Dignity Act. Id. § 127.805(2). Only
"capable" persons qualify for the provisions of the Act, id. § 127.805(1), and
"capable," according to the statutory language,
means that in the opinion of a court or in the opinion of the patient's
attending physician or consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, a
patient has the ability to make and communicate health care decisions to
health care providers, including communication through persons familiar
with the patient's manner of communicating if those persons are available.
Id. § 127.800(3). One who seeks to use the Death with Dignity Act to commit suicide
must make two oral requests to his or her physician, followed by a written request,
and fifteen days must separate the two oral requests. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.840. Two
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A maelstrom of statutes,4 9 judicial precedents, -" voter referenda, 51

court challenges, 2 and one all-important DEA regulation" surrounds
this statute. This part begins by examining the ongoing love-hate
(mostly hate) relationship between the federal government and the
Death with Dignity Act.
A. The Death with Dignity Act and the Ongoing FederalEffort To
Prevent Its Usage

The Death with Dignity Act became law after a four-year gestation
period that saw two voter referenda, a district court injunction which
was vacated by a circuit court, and a bitter fight in the United States
Congress.' On November 8, 1994, the Death with Dignity Act made
its first appearance at the Oregon ballot box as Ballot Measure 16,
which the voters passed by an approximate margin of 51% to 49%.55
people must witness this written request in the presence of the patient, and the
witnesses must attest that they believe that the patient is competent and making a
voluntary decision. Id. § 127.810(1). As a further safeguard. one of the witnesses may
not be a relative through blood, adoption, or marriage, a potential heir, an employee
or operator of the patient's health-care facility, or the patient's doctor. hi. §
127.810(2)-(3).
The Act also provides that the physician must make a judgment as to the patient's
competence and must discuss alternative means of care with the patient. Id. §
127.815(1)(a), (1)(c)(E). A second physician's opinion is necessary to confirm that
the patient is competent, suffering from a terminal disease as defined in the statute,
and acting voluntarily. Id. § 127.815(1)(d). If either physician believes that depression
or mental disorder is present, the patient must be sent to a psychologist or psychiatrist
for a final determination. Id. § 127.825. If the patient is found to suffer from
depression or mental disorder, he or she cannot utilize the Death with Dignity Act.
Id
49. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Controlled
Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823,824,841 (2000).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001)
(interpreting the Chevron standard of deference with respect to administrative
interpretations); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.. 532 U.S. 483, 486
(2001) (refusing to read a medical-use exception for marijuana into the CSA); Solid
Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159. 172-73 (2001)
(interpreting the avoidance principle); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735
(1997) (holding that states may prohibit assistance of suicide); United States v.
Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 138 (1975) (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) is applicable to
physicians).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 55, 62-63
52. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, No. 01-1647 (D. Or. Nov. 8. 2001), available at
http://wwwv.dwd.org/pdf/transcript.pdf.; Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or.
1995), vacated by 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
53. See Purpose of Issue of Prescription, 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2001).
54. Banning Use of Drugs for Assisted Suicide: Hearing on H.R. 4006 Before the
House SubcomM. on the Constitution House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1998) (statement of John A. Kitzhaber, M.D.. Governor, State of Oregon), available
at 1998 WL 403636. For a comprehensive history of the Death with Dignity Act, see
Oregon Death with Dignity: Respect the Will of the People, at
http:llwww.dwd.orgllav/chronology.asp (last visited Apr. 8. 2002) [hereinafter
DWDA Web Site].
55. U.S. Judge Keeps Oregon's New Suicide Law in Limbo, LA. Times, Dec. 28,
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After placing a preliminary injunction on the Death with Dignity
Act,56 District Court Judge Michael Hogan declared that Measure 16
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 7
In February 1997, however, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the federal
courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. 8 The court vacated
Judge Hogan's ruling and dismissed the complaint against the Death
with Dignity Act. 59 After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
October,'

the Death with Dignity Act again went to the voters of

Oregon.61 On November 4, 1997, Oregon voters considered Measure
51, which was structured as a referendum on the repeal of Measure
16.62 The Oregon voters decisively rejected Measure 51 by a 60%-

40% margin, and the Death with Dignity Act was retained. 63 At this

point, just when it looked as though the Act's three-year fight for
existence had come to an end, the federal government attempted to
intervene.
Soon after Oregonians rejected Measure 51, DEA Administrator
Thomas A. Constantine, acting at the request of Senator Orrin
Hatch' and Representative Henry J. Hyde,65 issued a policy statement
warning that doctors who assisted suicides by prescribing drugs to
terminally ill patients could be in violation of the CSA. 6 Constantine
opined that physician-assisted suicide was not a "legitimate medical
purpose" and that those who assisted suicides risked DEA revocation
of their registrations under the CSA. 67

On June 9, 1998, however,

1994, at A5.
56. Id.
57. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437. Judge Hogan concluded that "Measure 16
provide[d] a means to commit suicide to a severely overinclusive class" including
those who may have been "competent, incompetent, unduly influenced, or abused by
others." Id.
58. Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997).
59. Id.
60. Lee v. Harcleroad, 522 U.S. 927, 927 (1997).
61. Lynda Gorov, Campaign to Repeal Assisted Suicide Law Rivets Oregon Voters,
Boston Globe, Oct. 27, 1997, at Al.
62. Judith Graham & Judy Peres, Assisted-Suicide Door Opens Wide: Vote Puts
Oregon at Forefront,Chi. Trib., Nov. 6, 1997, at 1.
63. DWDA Web Site, supra note 54.
64. Mr. Hatch, a republican senator from Utah, was elected to the Senate in 1976
and served as Chair of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary from 1995-2001. See
Neil A. Lewis, At the Bar: A Republican SenatorForces the Administration to Rethink
Its Strategy on JudicialAppointments, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1994, at B7.
65. Mr. Hyde, a republican representative from Illinois, was elected to the House
of Representatives in 1974 and served as Chair of the House Committee on the
Judiciary from 1995-2001. Biography: Congressman Henry J. Hyde, at
http://www.house.gov/hyde/bio.htm (last visited Apr. 8,2002).
66. John A. Brennan, Note, A State Based Right to Physician Assisted Suicide, 79
B.U. L. Rev. 231,259 (1999).
67. Letter from Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration, to Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Judiciary Committee,
U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 5, 1997), availableat http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/constantine.htm.
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Attorney General Reno reversed Mr. Constantine's opinion in a letter
to Representative Hyde:
There is no evidence that Congress, in the CSA, intended to displace
the states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to
override a state's determination as to what constitutes legitimate
medical practice in the absence of a federal law prohibiting that

practice.
...[W]e have concluded that the CSA does not authorize DEA
to prosecute, or to revoke the DEA registration of, a physician who

has assisted in a suicide in compliance with Oregon law.'
With this ruling having effectively relegated the executive branch to
the sidelines, Congress became the primary site for the next round of
the federal battle against the Death with Dignity Act.'
The same day as the Reno ruling, Representative Hyde introduced
the "Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act" (H.R. 4006) in the House,
and Senator Don Nickles" introduced a companion bill in the
Senate.71 H.R. 4006 purported to reverse the Reno ruling by giving
the DEA power to rescind the registrations of physicians who
intentionally "dispense or distribute a controlled substance with a
purpose of causing, or assisting in causing, the suicide or euthanasia of
any individual."'
Because of significant opposition, however, the
House took no action on H.R. 4006 before the expiration of the
Congressional session in late 1998.-'
In 1999, Senator Nickles and Representative Hyde launched a
second attack on the Death with Dignity Act with the Pain Relief
Promotion Act ("PRPA"), which they introduced concurrently in the
Senate and House.74 The PRPA sought to allow a physician to
distribute large quantities of painkilling medications to a patient even

68. Reno Letter, supra note 21 (emphasis added). The emphasized phrase in
Attorney General Reno's ruling closely parallels the key language of 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04: "legitimate medical purpose." On March 24, 1998, in the interim between
Constantine's letter and Attorney General Janet Reno's final ruling on the matter, a
female victim of breast cancer from Portland, Oregon became the first person to
commit assisted suicide under the Death with Dignity Act. Egan, supra note 15.
69. Raphael Cohen-Almagor & Monica G. Hartman, The Oregon Death with
Dignity Act: Reviews and Proposalsfor Improvement, 27 J. Legis. 269,276 (2001).
70. Mr. Nickles, a representative from Oklahoma, was elected to the Senate in
1980 and has served as Assistant Republican Leader since 1996. See Biography,
Senator Don Nickles, at http'/www.senate.gov/-nickles/personalibiography.cfm (last
visited Apr. 8,2002).
71. Fallek, supra note 18, at 1746.
72. H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. § 2(c)(2) (1998), available at http:/lwww.missourilife.
org/legislation/drugsuicide.htm.
73. Fallek, supra note 18, at 1748.
74. Id.
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if the unintended result was the death of the patient.'5 In contrast,
physicians who intentionally distributed controlled substances for the
purposes of assisting suicide would have their licenses suspended and
would be subject to criminal prosecution under the CSA.76 On
October 27, 1999, the House of Representatives passed the PRPA by
a vote of 271-156. 77 Senate Republicans, however, never managed the
get the PRPA to the floor for a vote. 7 Amid filibuster threats from
Oregon's Senator Ron Wyden,79 the 1999 and 2000 sessions came and
went without a vote on the PRPA. 0 In the meantime, Texas
Governor George W. Bush, who supported the PRPA during a
campaign stop in Oregon,8s became President of the United States
after a bitterly contested election.' He appointed John D. Ashcroft,
former Governor of Missouri and recently-defeated United States
Senator from that state, z to succeed Janet Reno as Attorney
General.'
With the fight against the Death with Dignity Act indefinitely
stalled in Congress, the DOJ jumped back into the fray. 5 In a
November 6, 2001, "interpretive rule," Attorney General Ashcroft
reversed Janet Reno's policy toward the Death with Dignity Act and
75. Christin A. Batt, Comment, The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 and
Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Callfor CongressionalSelf-Restraint, 38 San Diego L.
Rev. 297, 308 (2001).
76. Id. at 309.
77. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 544, at http://clerkweb.house.gov/cgibin/vote.exe?year=1999&rollnumber=544 (last visited Apr. 8,2002). Not surprisingly,
all five of Oregon's representatives voted against passage. Id.
78. Stephanie Hendricks, Note, Pain Relief, Death with Dignity, and Commerce:
The Constitutionalityof CongressionalAttempts to Regulate Physician-AssistedSuicide
in Oregon via the Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison, 37 Willamette L. Rev.
691,693 (2001).
79. Mr. Wyden, a democratic senator from Oregon, was elected to the Senate in
1996 after serving for fifteen years in the House of Representatives. United States
Senator Ron Wyden, Biographical Information, at http://wwv.senate.gov/-wyden/
bio.htm (last visited Apr. 8,2002).
80. Robert A. Klinck, Recent Development: Pain Relief Promotion Act, 38 Harv.
J. on Legis. 249,253 (2001).
81. See R.G. Ratcliffe, Bush Says His Plan Could Result in Privatizing of Social
Security, Houston Chron., May 17,2000, at 4A.
82. Richard L. Berke & Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Pledges to be Presidentfor
"One Nation," Not One Party; Gore, Conceding, Urges Unity, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
2000, at Al.
83. John Ashcroft served two terms as Governor of Missouri from 1985 until 1993.
He served as a United States Senator from that state from 1995 until he became
Attorney General in 2001. See Laurie Goodstein, Ashcroft's Life and Judgments are
Steeped in Faith, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 2001, § 1, at 22. In just one of the many unusual
twists of the November 2000 election, Ashcroft lost his Senate seat to the late
Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan, who died in a plane crash on October 16, 2000.
Dead Man Wins Race in Missouri, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8,2000, at Al.
84. David E. Sanger, Conservative for Justice Post: Whitman Chosen to Head
E.P.A., N.Y. Times, Dec. 23,2000, at Al.
85. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Federal Agents Are Directed To Stop Physicians
Who Assist Suicides, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,2001, at A20.
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reinstated the original Constantine opinion.' According to Ashcroft's
directive: "[A]ssisting suicide is not a 'legitimate medical purpose'
within the meaning of 21 CFR § 1306.04 (2001), and.., prescribing,

dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to assist
suicide violates the CSA."

Ashcroft explicitly stated in this

interpretive rule that physicians participating in assisted suicide could
be punished by suspension or revocation of their licenses under the

CSA.rs The Attorney General based his reasoning in this two-page
directive on a twenty-four page advisory opinion authored by two
attorneys in the Office of Legal Counsel at DOJ, and this opinion
delineated several legal, ethical, and policy-related arguments
supporting Ashcroft's decision.'
The dispute between Oregon and the DOJ centers around the reach
of the CSA with respect to physicians, agency rulemaking procedures
under Supreme Court precedent, and the avoidance canon, with
particular attention paid to federalism and right-to-die issues." This
part now turns to these issues.
B. The Legal Background
1. The Controlled Substances Act
The Controlled Substances Act, which Congress enacted as Title II
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of

1970, regulates and controls the trafficking of illicit drugs and provides
penalties for statutory infractions.9 ' The statute separates the
86. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607, 56,607-08 (Nov. 9,2001).
87. Id. at 56,608.
88. Id. Notably, this DOJ interpretive rule mentioned nothing on the subject of
criminal prosecution of physicians, an important component of the Pain Relief
Promotion Act. See supra text accompanying note 76.
89. OLC Memorandum, supra note 1,passimn. This opinion was the work of
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sheldon Bradshaw and Special Counsel Robert J.
Delahunty. Id at 1. Though not available in the Federal Register, the full opinion
may be obtained from the Office of Diversion Control of the Drug Enforcement
Administration. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide. 66 Fed. Reg.
at 56,608.
90. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motions for
Summary Judgment at 12-35, 44-52, Oregon v. Ashcroft (D. Or. 2002) (No. 01-1647JO), available at http://www.compassionindying.orglnexk-ashcroft-ruling
DOJMemo_SJ.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,2002) [hereinafter DOJ Memorandum]
(discussing the reach of the CSA with respect to physicians, the constitutional
avoidance canon, and the APA); Oregon's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment at 20-26, Oregon v. Ashcroft (D. Or. 2002) (No. 01-1647-JO),
available at http://www.doj.state.or.usfags09436.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2002)
[hereinafter Oregon Memorandum] (discussing same issues).
91. Lisa Scott, The Pleasure Principle: A Critical Eramnination of Federal
Scheduling of Controlled Substances, 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. 447, 451-52 (2000). The
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differing varieties of illicit substances into five schedules. 92 The listing
of a drug in a particular schedule gives an indication of factors such as
its "potential for abuse"; 93 whether it has a recognized "medical use in
treatment"; 94 and whether "[a]buse of the drug or other substances
may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence." 95 Schedule
I, for example, contains highly addictive drugs such as lysergic acid
diethylamide ("LSD"), marijuana, and heroin.96
Substances in
Schedule II also have a high addiction potential, but Congress
separated them from Schedule I because those substances also have
accepted medical uses.97 Pentobarbital and secobarbital, the two most
commonly prescribed assisted-suicide drugs in Oregon,98 fall into
Schedule H.9 Authority to add substances to the schedules rests with
the Attorney General,100 and the statute compels all who seek to
dispense controlled substances, including physicians, to register with
the Attorney General.1"'
Before Congress amended the CSA in 1984, the Attorney General
maintained the authority to suspend or revoke the registrations of a
physician only for the following reasons: "1) falsification of an
application to dispense, distribute, or manufacture a controlled
substance, 2) a felony conviction related to a controlled substance, or
3) denial, revocation, or suspension of a state license or
registration."'" The 1984 amendment, known as the Dangerous Drug
Diversion Control Act, added an important provision giving the
Attorney General additional power to "deny an application for...
registration if he determines that the issuance of such registration
would be inconsistent with the public interest."'0 3 The Attorney
constitutionality of the CSA is beyond question. See United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d
949, 953 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that Congress acted within the scope of its
Commerce Clause power when it passed the CSA).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2000); Scott, supra note 91, at 452-55.
93. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A).
94. Id. § 812(b)(1)(B).
95. Id. § 812(b)(2)(C).
96. Id. § 812(c) Sched. I.
97. Id. § 812(b)(2)(B); see United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532
U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (denying the existence of a medical exception for the penalties
accompanying the illegal use of Schedule I drugs such as marijuana).
98. Fourth Annual Report, supra note 13, at 4.
99. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin., Diversion Control Program,
ControlledSubstances by Schedule, at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/
listby-sched/sched2.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)(1).
101. Id. § 822(a)(2).
102. Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use of Marijuana: A Look at Federal & State
Responses to California'sCompassionate Use Act, 2 DePaul J. Health Care L. 155, 169
n.113 (1997).
103. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f); Bergstrom, supra note 102, at 169 n.113. The CSA lists five
factors that the Attorney General should consider in determining the "public
interest": (1) recommendations of the State licensing board; (2) the applicant's
dispensing or research experience; (3) the applicant's criminal record for controlled
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General also has power to revoke or suspend existing registrations for
the same reason. 1°4
The responsibility for administering and enforcing the CSA rests
with the DOJ, and specifically the Attorney General.' One of the
ways in which the DOJ, like any federal agency, interprets and
enforces statutes is through the promulgation of regulations. t°6 The
most important DOJ regulation for the purposes of the Death with
Dignity Act is 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a): "A prescription for a controlled
substance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice.""0 7 Because the Attorney General has used it as
his legal basis for concluding that physicians' licenses may be revoked
or suspended under the CSA for assisting in suicides, 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04 is at the center of the Death with Dignity controversy."'
Before Attorney General Ashcroft may enforce 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04
or the CSA against Oregon physicians, however, he must confront the
fact that neither the regulation nor the statute explicitly prohibits
physician-assisted suicide. Consequently, an interpretation of the
regulation or statute, or both, is required."1 Agency interpretations of
statutes and regulations are commonplace,"" and, in large part, they
are governed by the APA and the Supreme Court's APA
precedents."'
2. Administrative Rulemaking
a. The Administrative ProcedureAct
Promulgated in 1946, the APA11 2 sets the general standards for
agency rulemaking and allows public accessibility and participation in
substance offenses; (4) compliance with local, state, and federal controlled substance

laws; (5) "other conduct which may threaten the public health and safety." 21 U.S.C.
§ 823(0.
104. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a).
105. See id § 821.
106. See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock
Deferenceto Agency Regulatory Interpretations,34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 49, 112 (2000).
107. Purpose of Issue of Prescription, 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2001). This regulation
officially is listed as a DEA regulation, but DEA falls under the auspices of DOJ. For
the sake of simplicity, this Note will refer to the regulation as a DOJ regulation.
Incidentally, 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 is similar to one of Oregon's statutes, which reads:
"Except in good faith and in the course of professional practice only, a practitioner or
a pharmacist may not dispense controlled substances." Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.185(5)

(2001).
108. See Verhovek, supra note 85.
109. See Angstreich, supra note 106, at 87-88.
110. See id (describing the large set of "unpersuasive
interpretations of ambiguous regulations and statutes").
111. Id at 76.
112. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2000).
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the process.11 3 Among other things, the APA provides for notice-andcomment rulemaking and sets the ground rules for statutorilymandated proceedings and adjudications." 4 The notice-and-comment
provision requires that "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall
be published in the Federal Register" and that such notice must
contain the "time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings."'' 5 A rule that follows this format is called a "legislative
rule," and this type of rule carries the force of law and must be
affirmed by courts as long as the agency has validly exercised its
authority to promulgate it." 6 Several CSA provisions directly
implicate this provision of the APA." 7 For example, the CSA
requires the Attorney General to follow APA notice-and-comment
requirements before adding a controlled substance to one of the five
schedules." 8 Indeed, if the Attorney General wished to promulgate
another regulation to implement the CSA, he or she would have to
follow the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA."19
A statutory exception to the APA notice-and-comment
requirement involves "interpretive rules, general statements of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice."' 20 Though
interpretive rules carry this exemption, making it easier for agencies
to promulgate them quickly, interpretive rules differ from legislative
rules because they do not bind the courts, public, or the agency
itself.' Instead, a particular interpretive rule derives its power from
the court itself when the court, during the process of statutory
interpretation,
chooses to defer to the interpretation contained in the
22
rule.

1

The Supreme Court recently has suggested that interpretive rules
are not entitled to the same level of judicial deference as rules that are
products of "formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking"
(e.g., legislative rules or regulations). 23 Not surprisingly, many
administrative law cases turn on how much deference the court should

113. Jamie A. Yavelberg, Note, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial
Deference to Agency InterpretationsAfter EEOC v. Aramco, 42 Duke L.J. 166, 199

(1992).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 554.
115. Id.§553(b).
116. 1 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise
233-34 (3d ed. 1994).
117. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811,824(c) (2000).
118. Id. § 811(a).
119. See 1 Davis & Pierce, supra note 116, at 233-34.
120. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). As stated previously, Attorney General Ashcroft's
directive to the DEA is an interpretive rule. See supra text accompanying note 86.
121. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995); 1 Davis & Pierce,
supra note 116, at 234.
122. 1 Davis & Pierce, supra note 116, at 234.
123. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
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accord to a rule or interpretation that24falls under the APA's exception
to its notice-and-comment provision.
b. Chevron and Seminole Rock
A landmark administrative law case that grapples with the question
of deference outside the notice-and-comment context is Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.1' In Chevron,
the Supreme Court assessed an Environmental Protection Agency
regulation interpreting the Clean Air Act.'2- The Court upheld the
regulation:
ff Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations
are given controlling weight unless127they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.
Chevron analysis involves a two-step process.'2' In "step one," the
court assesses whether Congress has given the agency administrative
authority to interpret the statute.2 9 If the agency has interpretive
authority, the court must determine whether Congress's intent is clear
from the statute. 30 If so, "that is the end of the matter,"'' and the
court enforces the clear congressional intent.'32 If Congress's intent is
ambiguous, however, the court proceeds to "step two."' ' In this step,
the court will defer to the agency's reading of the statute if the
interpretation
is "based on a permissible construction of the
statute. ' ' 134
The Chevron doctrine generally applies when an agency attempts to
interpret a statute. 135 In this case, however, the Attorney General's
interpretive rule purports to interpret the "legitimate medical
purpose" language of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04, which is a regulation. A
separate line of Supreme Court cases deals with this issue, and the
wellspring of this line is Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.'- The
Court in Seminole Rock ruled that an "administrative
interpretation.., becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly
124. See, eg., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)
125. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
126. Id.at 840.
127. Id. at 843-44.
128. See Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 588 (1998).
129. Angstreich, supra note 106, at 62.
130. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
131. Id. at 842-43.
132. Id.; Angstreich supra note 106, at 61.
133. Angstreich, supra note 106, at 61.
134. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
135. Thomas W. Merrill. Judicial Deference to Frecutive Precedent, 101 Yale L.
969, 979 (1992).
136. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
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erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. 13 7 This standard,
which the Court continues to apply, obviously does not give a
reviewing court much opportunity to overrule agency interpretations
of regulations. As a practical matter, it would be difficult for an
agency to construct an interpretation, no matter how controversial,
that was plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the language of its
regulation.
This fact has led to sharp criticism of Seminole Rock. Robert A.
Anthony calls the Seminole Rock test "an indulgent, if not downright
abject standard of deference," and complains that Seminole Rock
weakens Chevron by encouraging agencies to promulgate vague
regulations and then "clarify" them with interpretive rules that receive
Seminole Rock deference without notice-and-comment procedure. 3 s
John Manning also has considered this problem and suggests that
courts should first address the Chevron issue of whether a regulation,
as interpreted by the agency, violates the statute, and then, under
Seminole Rock, whether the interpretation is consistent with the
regulation.'39
Scott H. Angstreich, in a spirited defense of Seminole Rock,
disagrees with Manning's approach and argues that Seminole Rock
should be interdependent with the Chevron test.14° If an agency
interprets an ambiguous statute through one of its regulations, the
court must decide if the regulation, as interpreted by the agency,
represents an unreasonable reading of the statute (Chevron step
two). 141
Seminole Rock analysis helps the court determine the
meaning of the regulation in the first place: either the Court will defer
to the agency's reading of the regulation or it will reject the agency
reading as plainly erroneous or inconsistent and substitute its own
reading of the regulation.142 At that point, the court can review the

137. Id. at 414.
138. See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They
Just Don't Get It, 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 1, 4-5 (1996).
139. John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretationsof Agency Rides, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 627 n.78 (1996). The problem
with Manning's approach is that a court "could hold that (a) the regulation, as
interpreted, does not violate the statute [Chevron], but (b) the interpretation is
inconsistent with the regulation [Seminole Rock]." Angstreich, supra note 106, at 73.
Along these lines, at least one circuit court has said that "there are few, if any, cases in
which the standard applicable under Chevron would yield a different result than the
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent' standard set forth in [Seminole Rock]." Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Some lower
courts actually have applied Chevron, rather than Seminole Rock, to administrative
interpretations of regulations. See Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc v. United States, 106 F.3d
376, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Malcomb v. Island Creek Coal Co., 15 F.3d 364, 369 (4th
Cir. 1994).
140. Angstreich, supra note 106, at 74.
141. Id. at 72-73.
142. See id. at 71-72.
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relationship between regulation and statute under Chevron.14 3 Hence,
Angstreich claims, "[I]n many cases, the Seminole Rock one-step [test]
will be a prelude to the Chevron two-step, because the output of
applying Seminole Rock deference is an input in the application of
Chevron deference." 144
c. Chevron Deference and the Lack of Adjudication or Notice-andComment Rulemaking
In determining the appropriateness of deferring to administrative
interpretations, the Court, especially in recent times, has considered
whether an agency promulgated the interpretation in accordance with
APA rulemaking standards such as adjudication or notice-andcomment procedures (in other words, whether the interpretation
resembles a legislative rule or an interpretive rule).'
Two recent
cases, Auer v. Robbins'" and Christensen v. Harris County,"
demonstrate that the application of Chevron to agency interpretations
lacking adjudicatory or notice-and-comment pedigree depends on
whether the agency is interpreting a regulation or whether it is
interpreting a statute. 48
In Auer, the Court considered a Labor Department interpretation
of its own regulation, 49 which in turn interpreted the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 5 ' Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia first
determined that Chevron deference was appropriate with respect to
the regulation itself because congressional intent was unclear (step
one) and the regulation was not an unreasonable reading of the
statute (step two). 151 Justice Scalia then moved to the Secretary's
interpretation of the regulation."
Despite the fact that the
interpretation was put forth in an amicus brief and was not the
product of adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, Justice
Scalia found it deserving of deference under the "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent" standard of Seminole Rock.'
Apparently untroubled
143. Id. at 72.

144. Id.at 73.
145. Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulentaking Spectrum: Assuring
ProperRespect for an Essential Element, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 803, 833 (2001).

146. 519 U.S. 452 (1997)
147. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
148. Angstreich, supra note 106, at 54-55.
149. The regulation at issue was 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (2001), which outlines the
so-called "salary basis test" by which the Secretary of Labor may determine whether a
public-sector employee is exempt from overtime pay under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)
(2000).
150. The provision of the Act at issue is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
According to this provision, "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional"
employees are exempt from overtime pay.
151. Auer, 519 U.S. at 457-58.
152. Id. at 461.
153. Id at 461.
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by the interpretation's informal genesis, Justice Scalia noted the
following: "[The Secretary] is free to write the regulations as1 broadly
54
as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the statute. 1
In contrast, the Court in Christensen refused to defer to a
Department of Labor opinion letter interpreting the Fair Labor
Standards Act because the letter was not the product of formal
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. 155 Eschewing the
traditional Chevron two-step formula, Justice Thomas's majority
opinion first ' found
the Secretary's interpretation of the statute
"unpersuasive '15 and then substituted its own "better reading" of the
statute.5 7 The Court then moved to the Chevron question and noted
that the interpretation in question was not "arrived at after.., a
formal
adjudication
or
notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
Interpretations such as those in opinion letters... do not warrant
Chevron-style deference. "158 For good measure, Justice Thomas
noted that Seminole Rock deference was not appropriate for the
Secretary's interpretation of the regulation because the language of
the regulation was not ambiguous,159 and regulatory ambiguity is
necessary for Seminole Rock to apply.
The next term, the Supreme Court returned to the topic of Chevron
deference in United States v. Mead Corp."6° Mead presented the Court
with a Christensen-type situation: an administrative interpretation of
a statute.161 Once again, the Court refused to apply Chevron to the
interpretation because, among other reasons, the interpretation
lacked notice-and-comment pedigree. 62 While refusing to bind itself
to a bright-line rule, the Court noted that "the overwhelming number
of... cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed ' the
fruits of
63
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.'
Though Auer stands for the proposition that deference is
permissible for informal agency interpretations of regulations,
Christensen and Mead demonstrate that the Court will not defer to
interpretations of statutes unless the interpretation under
consideration is a legislative rule or the product of public proceedings
outlined in the APA. That a court refuses to defer to an informal
154. Id. at 463.
155. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). But see NationsBank
of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 254 (1995) (using Chevron to
uphold Comptroller's interpretation of the National Bank Act despite lack of
adjudicatory or notice-and-comment rulemaking).
156. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 583.
157. Id. at 585.
158. Id. at 587.

159. Id. at 588.
160. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
161. At issue in Mead were United States Customs Service interpretations of tariff
classifications in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 with respect to three-ring binders. See id. at 221-25.
162. Id. at 233.
163. Id. at 230.
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interpretation of a statute should not end the analysis, however,
because the interpretation still may be entitled to some respect from
the reviewing court.
d. Skidmore Analysis
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court is reluctant to apply Chevron
to interpretations of statutes not arising out of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. In such cases, courts may give "some deference" to an
agency's interpretation out of respect for the agency's "specialized
experience and broader investigations and information" concerning
the subject-matter of the statute or regulation."
This form of deference dates back to the Supreme Court's 1944
decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., in which a unanimous Court,
speaking through Justice Jackson, ruled that an agency judgment is
"entitled to respect," and that the "weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control."' 65 In Mead, the Supreme Court
characterized the application of Skidmore to an agency interpretation
not as a matter of "deference," as with Chevron, but as a matter of
"respect according to its persuasiveness.""
A major difference between the doctrines is that Skidmore demands
a different judicial mindset than ChevronlSeminole Rock:
A court applying Skidmore is seeking the interpretation that is
correct, in the sense that it is the most persuasive. A premise of
both Chevron and Seminole Rock deference, however, "is that no
such thing exists."... [A] court applying Chevron and Seminole

Rock asks whether the agency has arrived at a reasonable answer, of
which there likely are many."' 67
Skidmore, which tests persuasiveness, clearly presents a higher bar for
the agency's interpretation than Chevron, which tests permissibility."
Some commentators feel that this higher standard is appropriate when
Despite the
informal agency interpretations are at issue.'"
protestations of Justice Scalia, 7 ' the Supreme Court in Mead upheld
164. See id. at 234 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
165. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
166. Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
167. Angstreich, supra note 106, at 88 (quoting Michael Her, Deference Running
Riot SeparatingInterpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 Admin. L.J. Am.
U. 187, 196 (1992)).
168. See Manning, supra note 139, at 687; supra note 134 and accompanying text.
169. Anthony, supra note 138, at 10; Manning, supra note 139, at 686.
170. Justice Scalia, formerly a professor of administrative law, argues that Chevron
rendered Skidmore obsolete:
Chevron-type deference can be inapplicable for only three reasons: (1) the
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the use of the Skidmore doctrine where an agency interpretation of a

171
statute fails to satisfy the requirements of the Chevron test.

When a court has to assess an agency's interpretation of a statute, it
may decide that an agency has come too close for comfort to the outer
limits of constitutionality. 172 The court may decide that, unless
Congress clearly intended the constitutionally questionable
interpretation, a construction of the statute that avoids the
constitutional dilemma is preferable.173

This canon of statutory

construction is known as the avoidance canon.
3. The Avoidance Canon
In Chevron, the Supreme Court approved the use of traditional
tools, or canons, of statutory construction in determining
congressional intent.1 74 One such canon states that if an interpretation
of a statute raises serious constitutional questions, courts will construe
the statute to avoid these questions unless Congress clearly intended

the constitutionally dubious construction.175 The Supreme Court has
long accepted this canon of avoidance as a "cardinal principle" of
statutory construction. 176 For example, in Solid Waste Agency v. U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, the Court applied the avoidance canon to
statute is unambiguous, so there is no room for administrative
interpretation; (2) no interpretation has been made by personnel of the
agency responsible for administering the statute; or (3) the interpretation
made by such personnel was not authoritative, in the sense that it does not
represent the official position of the expert agency. All of these reasons
preclude Skidmore deference as well.
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). But see Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference:
Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 Win. and Mary L.
Rev. 1105, 1111 (2001) (disagreeing with Justice Scalia's position).
171. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
172. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 172-73 (2001).
173. Id.
174. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984) ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect.").
175. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172. At issue in this case was the Clean
Water Act, which granted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authority "to issue
permits 'for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites."' Id. at 163 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994)). An
Environmental Protection Agency regulation known as the "Migratory Bird Rule"
granted the Corps authority over intrastatewaters "[wlhich are or would be used as
habitat by... migratory birds which cross state lines." Id. at 164. Because the
regulation would have resulted in Commerce Clause questions invoking "the outer
limits of Congress' power," the Court demanded "a clear indication that Congress
intended that result." Id. at 172. In the absence of such intent, the Court rejected the
"Migratory Bird Rule." Id. at 173-74.
176. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
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save a provision of the Clean Water Act from a Commerce Clause
challenge.1" In United States v. Bass, the Court refused to allow an
interpretation of a statute that "render[ed] traditionally local criminal
conduct a matter for federal enforcement" and "dramatically
intrud[ed] upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction."'"
To take an example, in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 9 an important

avoidance case, a federal statute prevented labor unions from
encouraging an employee strike against secondary employers." A
union protested the payment of substandard wages by a construction
company by encouraging workers to distribute handbills at the mall
entrance asking customers to boycott the mall until the company
raised its wages.181 The National Labor Relations Board interpreted
the statute to prohibit this handbilling.'1 The Supreme Court
disagreed because the NLRB interpretation of the statute implicated a
possible First Amendment issue that the Court did not wish to
reach.1" According to the Court, the statute could be just as viably
interpreted not to prohibit the handbilling-a reading not
contradicted by clear congressional intent-and the Court settled on
this interpretation
in order to save the statute from constitutional
difficulties. 84
In light of the current Supreme Court's willingness to strike down
congressional actions that exceed the limits of the Commerce Clause
or the separation of powers doctrine,"s the federal government could
find the avoidance canon a considerable obstacle to otherwise
acceptable interpretations of statutes and regulations that infringe on
177. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173-74.
178. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971).

179. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
180.
181.
182.
183.

See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1994).
DeBartolo,485 U.S. at 570-71.
Id. at 573.
See id.at 578.

184. Id at 588.
185. See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,

174 (2001) (finding that the Migratory Bird Rule resulted in "significant impingement
of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use"); United States

v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women
Act because "[glender-motivated crimes of violence are not ... economic activity");
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-28 (1997) (holding interim provisions of the

Brady Act unconstitutional because the federal government cannot compel the States
to enact or implement federal regulatory programs); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 561 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School Zones Act "has nothing to do with

'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise"); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (warning that "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program'

(quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation

Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)) (alteration in original)); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 350 (1971) (refusing to construe a federal firearms statute in such a manner
that "dramatically intrude[d] upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction").
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traditional state powers. 86 Another area of the law in which the
Supreme Court has refused to trample on traditional state powers
bears directly on the Death with Dignity controversy: the so-called
"right to die."'"
4. The "Right To Die" Cases
The Supreme Court has entered the right-to-die debate in a wellknown trio of cases: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,' Washington v. Glucksberg,189 and Vacco v. Quill.190 In
Cruzan, the Court upheld a Missouri law that would not allow a third
party to make end-of-life decisions regarding life-sustaining medical
treatment of an unconscious patient without clear and convincing
evidence of that patient's desires.' 91 In concurrence, Justice O'Connor
noted that "we decide only that one State's practice does not violate
the Constitution; the more challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests is
entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States."'"
Justice Scalia
emphasized the same point in his concurring opinion: "[E]ven when it
is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that a patient no
longer wishes certain measures to be taken to preserve his or her life,
it is up to the citizens of Missouri to decide, through
their elected
93
representatives, whether that wish will be honored."'
Seven years later, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court upheld
Washington's ban on the promoting of suicide 94 in the face of an
equal protection challenge.195 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
186. Cf Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial
Monopoly on Constitutional Interpretation, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 481, 486 (1990)
(arguing that the requirement of congressional intent to enter a constitutionally
dangerous area "actually has the effect of enhancing judicial activism in some
significant respects"); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816 (1983) ("The practical effect of
interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions is ... to enlarge the
already vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant
modern interpretation of the Constitution .... ").
187. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,277 (1990).
188. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
189. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
190. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
191. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-81.
192. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he... challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures for safeguarding... liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the
States." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
193. Cruzan,497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
194. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.060 (West 2000).
195. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). The companion case to
Glucksberg, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), was decided on the same day. At
issue in Quill was New York's ban on the assistance of suicide. N.Y. Penal Law §
125.15 (McKinney 1987). Again writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
quickly disposed of the Equal Protection challenge to the statute: "Everyone,
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Rehnquist noted that "our laws have consistently condemned, and
continue to prohibit, assisting suicide." '
Nevertheless, the Chief
Justice left final resolution of the matter to the individual states:
"Americans are engaged in earnest and profound debate about the
morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society." 1" Justice O'Connor took the same view, and her concurring
opinion reproduces her Cruzan formulation: "States are presently
undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physician-assisted
suicide .... In such circumstances, the.., challenging task of crafting
appropriate procedures for safeguarding... liberty interests is
entrusted to the laboratory of the States .... I"
Glucksberg stands for the proposition that while the states may ban
the assistance of suicide, they do not have to.'" Judging from his
recent actions with respect to the Death with Dignity Act, Attorney
General Ashcroft apparently disagrees with this view as long as the
method of assisting suicides involves federally controlled
substances. 21 The interpretive rule embodying this disagreement has
led to the current battle between the DOJ and Oregon.ul Having
sketched the pertinent historical legal background of this battle, the
next part of this Note examines the conflict in detail.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE
DOJ's INTERPRETATION OF 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04

The United States Department of Justice and the Oregon
Department of Justice sharply disagree over whether the CSA permits
revocation of the licenses of physicians who assist suicides under
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act.0 - Section A outlines the argument
that the DOJ interpretive rule is not entitled to judicial deference
under the Chevron line of Supreme Court cases. This argument
regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted
lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide." Id. at 800.
Justice O'Connor again provided the fifth vote, and her opinion repeated her

Glucksberg concurrence. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
196. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719.
197. Id. at 735.
198. Id. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotations

omitted).
199. See Steven B. Datlof, Beyond Washington v. Glucksberg: Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act Analyzed from Medical and Constitutional Perspectives, 14 J.L &
Health 23, 44 (1999-2000) ("The Court has shown great willingness to allow the states
to determine their own policies regarding end-of-life decision making through debate
and legislation.").
200. See DOJ Memorandum, supra note 90, at 32.
201. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
202. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001); Oregon Memorandum, supra note 90, at 26-30.
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emphasizes the Supreme Court's refusal in Christensen to defer to
informal agency interpretations of statutes." Section B, in contrast,
sketches the argument that the DOJ interpretive rule is entitled to
Chevron deference. This argument relies on the Supreme Court's
holding in Auer that informal agency interpretations of regulations
may qualify for Chevron deference.c°
A. The Argument that the Courts Should Not Defer to the DOJ's
Interpretationof 21 C.ER. § 1306.04
The strongest argument for refusing Chevron deference to the DOJ
interpretive rule follows the Supreme Court's recent rulings in
Christensen and Mead. In Christensen, the Court clearly stated that
administrative interpretations lacking the force of law "do not warrant
Chevron-style deference."' °5 Interpretive rules such as the one at
issue here do not carry the force of law2 6 and therefore appear
exempt from Chevron treatment under the Court's holding in
Christensen. That the Court pulled back somewhat from this holding
in Mead does not affect the analysis, for the Court still acknowledged
that the "overwhelming" number of cases in which Chevron was
applied involved adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.2' 7
After disposing of the Chevron issue, the Christensen Court next
assessed the Seminole Rock problem.2
The Court found Seminole
Rock inapplicable in that case because the regulation at issue was not
ambiguous."°
The Court, therefore, chose to enforce what it
perceived as the clear meaning of the regulation over the
administrator's contrary interpretation.10 In the Death with Dignity
controversy, unlike in Christensen, the regulation at issue is
ambiguous because the word "legitimate" in the phrase "legitimate
medical purpose" is undefined.2 11 The Seminole Rock "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent" test therefore applies. Even if, however,
the court decided that the DOJ interpretation of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04
qualified for Seminole Rock deference, Chevron deference already has
been ruled out. Under the Supreme Court's holding in Mead, the next
analytical step is to apply the Skidmore standards because "Chevron
203. See supra notes 155-159 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
205. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
206. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
207. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). The Court added, "That said,
and as significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want
of that procedure here does not decide the case.... Id. at 230-31.
208. See Christensen,529 U.S. at 588.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2001).
212. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see supra text
accompanying note 137.
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did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form."21'3
One of the important factors in Skidmore analysis is whether the
statutory interpretation at issue conflicts with a prior interpretation by
the same agency.21 4 In Hall v. EPA,1 5 for example, the Ninth Circuit
did not accord Skidmore deference to the Environmental Protection
Agency's reading of the Clean Air Act because the EPA's
interpretation of the Act "[did] not fit ith [the EPA's] prior
interpretations. 2 6 Similarly, the DOJ interpretive rule does not fit
with the DOJ's prior interpretation of the CSA with respect to the
Death with Dignity Act because it reverses Attorney General Reno's
1998 ruling on the matter.217 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit assessed
the agency's "special expertise in advocating [the] interpretation."21
The DOJ's expertise in the area of physician-assisted suicide is
dubious at best because it is a law-enforcement agency, not a group of
medical professionals or ethicists. 2 9 In the opinion of two influential
commentators, this factor is extremely important in the assessment of
administrative interpretations. -2 ° The inconsistency and the expertise
factors working together, therefore, would weigh against the
persuasiveness of the interpretive rule. Therefore, the rule would be
entitled to little, if any, respect under Skidmore.
Consequently, Oregon can use Christensen and Skidmore to argue
that the courts should not afford deference or respect to the DOJ
interpretive rule. The DOJ, on the other hand, can make a
counterargument for deference by highlighting the Auer case and the
Mead Court's refusal to set hard-and-fast rules about Chevron's
relationship to informal rulemaking.
B. The Argument that Courts Should Defer to the DOJ Interpretation
of2l C.F.R. § 1306.04
A potential response to the arguments against deference begins
with the contention that Auer is the controlling precedent in this
dispute, not Christensen or Mead. The support for this contention lies
in the fact that Auer dealt specifically with an administrative
interpretation of a regulation,-' and that Auer is more faithful than
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218. 234 (2001): see supra note 171.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
273 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)
273 F.3d at 1156.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

218. Hall,273 F.3d at 1156.

219. See Oregon Memorandum, supra note 90, at 25.
220. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems
in the Making and Application of Law 1312-13 (1994) (noting the significance of an
"agency's expertise and first-line status").
221. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,461 (1997).
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Christensen to the two-step Chevron analysis.2" Under the Auer
formulation, the DOJ interpretive rule could pass muster.
An Auer analysis would begin in the same place as Chevron step
one: an assessment of whether the statute at issue is ambiguous.2
The CSA gives the Attorney General power to revoke the licenses of
physicians under the "inconsistent with the public interest" provision
of 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4). 224 Phrases such as "public interest" are the
epitome of vagueness and demonstrate obvious congressional
ambiguity. 22 Furthermore, delegation of rulemaking authority to the
Attorney General is explicit in the statute, 22 6 thereby satisfying the
first step of the Chevron test. 227
Following the lead of Auer, the court would allow any reasonable
interpretation of the statute to stand under Chevron step two. 228 The
"legitimate medical purpose" standard of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)
certainly is a reasonable reading of the CSA's prohibition on the
prescribing of drugs in a manner "inconsistent with the public
interest." 9 Under Chevron, therefore, the reviewing court would
defer to the regulation. Finally, the court would have to assess
whether the agency's interpretation of that regulation is "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."" 3 There is at least
some evidence that the DOJ's reading of the regulation, if not the best
reading, is at least not inconsistent with the "legitimate medical
purpose" language of the regulation.
For example, one key to the reasonableness of the DOJ's
2' 3
interpretation is the meaning of the regulatory word "legitimate. '
In order to determine if the DOJ's reading of the regulation is
reasonable, a definition of that word is necessary. Because the
regulation itself is silent on this issue, the best place to start is with a
dictionary, which is exactly what Justice Scalia did in Auer.32 The
Oxford English Dictionary defines "legitimate" as "[c]onformable to
law or rule; sanctioned or authorized by law or right; lawful; proper"
2 33
and "[n]ormal, regular; conformable to a recognized standard type.
222. See id. at 457-58.

223. Id.
224. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
225. Anthony, supra note 138, at 11. Professor Anthony calls this phrase, among
others, "[v]acuous" and "deficient in identifiable meaning." Id.
226. See 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
228. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 458.
229. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f).
230. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.
410, 414 (1945)).

231. Purpose of Issue of Prescription, 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2001).
232. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. In this case, the Court found the agency's interpretation
to be consistent with the dictionary definition of the words at issue in the statute and
upheld the interpretation. Id.
233. Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/find
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The primary definition in Black's Law Dictionary is similar:
"Complying with the law; lawful."2-' For the vast majority of states,
physician-assisted suicide is not lawful,2-" and therefore not
"legitimate" under these definitions. DOJ's interpretation of 21
C.F.R. § 1306.04(a), therefore, clearly does not run counter to the
language of the regulation.
Under an Auer analysis, therefore, the DOJ interpretive rule would
clear the "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"
test.23 6 As in Auer, this agency interpretation would be entitled to
deference, and the DOJ could argue that courts should allow it to
stand notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decisions in Christensen
and Mead.
III. THE COURTS NEED NOT DEFER TO THE DoJ's
INTERPRETATION OF 21

C.F.R. § 1306.04

Though the DOJ interpretative rule may not be the best reading of
the 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04, it is a plausible interpretation of the
regulation that should satisfy the Seminole Rock test. Nevertheless,
the Attorney General's lack of compliance with standards of
adjudicatory or notice-and-comment rulemaking found both in the
APA and in the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence should
disqualify the DOJ directive from receiving Chevron deference.2-1
Furthermore, the interpretation is not persuasive, and the courts
should afford it little respect under Skidmore.
Finally, the
interpretation implicates constitutional problems. The Supreme
Court has indicated a willingness to use the avoidance canon to
sidestep unnecessary confrontations of constitutional issues.' While
the Court may have been unenthusiastic about invoking the canon
when the constitutional issue involved abortion,29 the Court has been
more than willing to use it where, as here, federalism questions were
involved.' °
word?query-type=word&queryword=legitimate (last visited Apr. 8, 2002). The DOJ

focuses exclusively on the various dictionary definitions of "medical," while ignoring
"legitimate." See DOJ Memorandum, supra note 90, at 33.
234. Black's Law Dictionary 912 (7th ed. 1999).
235. See supra note 7.
236. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461; Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414
(1945).

237. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b) (1994); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001);
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
238. M. Gavan Montague, Note, Should Aliens Be Indefinitely Detained Under 8
U.S.C. § 1231? Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under Renewed Scrutiny,
69 Fordham L. Rev. 1439, 1447 (2001).
239. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991) (holding that a Department
of Health & Human Services regulation that prevented abortion counseling in
federally-funded facilities did not implicate a constitutional question serious enough
to merit use of the avoidance doctrine).
240. See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159
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A. OutrightJudicialDeference Is Not Appropriate in Cases Involving
InformalAdministrative Interpretationsof Statutes and Regulations
The DOJ interpretive rule brings into focus two radically differing
approaches to administrative deference. One approach, favored by
Professors Anthony and Manning, Justice Thomas in Christensen, and,
more cautiously, Justice Souter in Mead, would all but completely
deny Chevron deference to any agency interpretation that did not
arise out of adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. A
competing approach, taken by Mr. Angstreich and Justice Scalia in
Auer, favors a liberal use of Seminole Rock to uphold an agency's
informal interpretations of regulations that already merit Chevron
deference. This section argues that the former approach is preferable.
Under Seminole Rock, courts may treat informal agency
interpretations with deference even though those interpretations carry
no force of law and do not technically bind the courts. 24' After
Christensen and Mead, however, the Court is faced with two choices:
(1) reaffirm Auer and explain the differences between Seminole Rock
and Chevron that led to the distinction between informal
interpretations of regulations (reviewed under Seminole Rock per
Auer) and informal interpretations of statutes (reviewed under
Skidmore per Christensen); or (2) support Christensen's holding that
informal agency interpretations do not warrant Chevron deference, a
holding which may signal an overruling of Auer and an undermining
of Seminole Rock.24 The latter approach is preferable for several
reasons.

First, the distinction between interpretations of statutes and
interpretations of regulations is highly complicated and is best
avoided. The DOJ interpretive rule at issue here demonstrates the
difficulty. On the one hand, the Attorney General states, "I hereby
determine that assisting suicide is not a 'legitimate medical purpose'
within the meaning of 21 CFR § 1306.04 (2001), ' '243 which is clearly an
interpretation of the regulation. The regulation, however, mentions
nothing of suspension of physicians' licenses. For that provision, the
Attorney General must interpret the statute: "Such conduct by a

physician... may render his registration... subject to possible
suspension or revocation under 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4)." 2 " A court
assessing this interpretive rule would have to determine what kind of
interpretation it is (regulatory or statutory) before applying Auer or
Christensen. Such a distinction is unnecessary: the Ashcroft directive
has the same practical force with either reading. The crucial fact that
(2001); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
241. See supra text accompanying note 121.
242. Angstreich, supra note 106, at 56-57.
243. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
244. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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does not change, however, is that it was not promulgated through
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
When agencies are allowed to promulgate interpretations of
regulations with the expectation that they will enjoy judicial deference
under Seminole Rock, a second problem arises. Agencies will have an
incentive to formulate vague regulations which must be clarified by
broad interpretive rules that receive deference under Seminole Rock.
Professor Anthony notes that Seminole Rock results in agencies
"issuing 'interpretations' to create... new law without observance of
24
notice and comment procedures.""
Professor Manning makes a
similar point: "[S]ince the agency can say what its own regulations
mean... the agency bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or
imprecision.""4 At the heart of the APA is public participation in the
making of rules that bind the public and the courts. ' Professors
Anthony and Manning point out that Seminole Rock allows the
administrators to make binding rules while ignoring the requirements
of the APA.24
This problem leads, in turn, to a third difficulty. The Seminole Rock
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent" test is so easy for the agency to
pass that "[rleasonable contrary interpretations favoring other parties
are trampled." '49 Furthermore, agencies can promulgate informal
interpretations at their whim without the rigors of the notice-andcomment process. The regulated parties, such as the Oregon
physicians in this case, would have little warning of the state of the law
and would find themselves waiting in limbo while the agency moves
from interpretation to interpretation with each new presidential
administration (as seems to have happened here)."
Finally, Professor Anthony contends that application of Seminole
Rock to informal agency interpretations violates the APA itself."'
The APA requires the court to "determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action."' - According to
Anthony, "it is wrong for the courts to abdicate their office of
determining the meaning of the agency regulation and submissively
give controlling effect to a not-inconsistent agency position." 3 For
Anthony, Chevron and Skidmore pass muster under the APA. - ' With
Chevron, the court follows the APA by asking whether Congress has
granted rulemaking power to the agency and giving deference to a
245. Anthony, supra note 138, at 12.
246. Manning, supra note 139, at 655.
247. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.

248. See Anthony, supra note 138, at 4.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 10.
See Manning, supra note 139, at 671.
Anthony, supra note 138, at 9-10.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
Anthony, supra note 138, at 9.
See id at 10, 23-24.
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permissible interpretation exercised pursuant to that delegation of
power (i.e. via adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking). 2-5
With Skidmore, the court itself determines the persuasiveness of the
interpretation, which clearly comports with the APA. 6
Professor Anthony argues that Seminole Rock must be subject to
the same restrictions. He claims that
Issuance of informal rule documents without observing legislative
rulemaking procedures cannot be "lawmaking," even if their subject
is interpretation of regulations. While the agency may indeed
possess delegated subject-matter authority to interpret its own
regulations, the exercise of that power to make law depends upon
using the procedure and format that Congress
has specified for
257
making law, usually notice-and-comment.
Anthony's position appears consistent with United States v. Mead
Corp., in which the Supreme Court held that the agency did not have
a "lawmaking pretense in mind" when it interpreted the statute at
issue without notice-and-comment procedures.2 8 Accordingly, the
Court held the interpretation "beyond the Chevron pale." 9 Even in
the midst of his defense of the Seminole Rock doctrine, Scott
Angstreich concedes that Professor Anthony's ' APA
criticism "poses a
2
significant obstacle to the doctrine's retention. 60
The criticisms of Professors Anthony and Manning argue
compellingly in favor of reducing Seminole Rock to a minor player in
the contest between Oregon and the DOJ. The better approach is to
follow the Supreme Court's recent Christensen and Mead decisions,
which give great weight to the procedural genesis of the rule at issue.
In essence, this approach adds an "intermediate step" to Chevron
analysis (sort of a Chevron step one-and-one-half) whereby the court
determines "whether the agency's interpretation appears in a format
that has the force of law. ' 261 If so, the court moves to Chevron, step
two (permissibility test). 62 If not, the court assesses the interpretation
under Skidmore (persuasiveness test). 63
Lest it seem completely forgotten, there is a place for Seminole
Rock in this formulation. As Mr. Angstreich has pointed out, "[w]hen
an agency's interpretation of a statute is contained in a regulation, a
court reviewing that interpretation under Chevron must first ascertain
the meaning of the regulation. The initial inquiry is governed by
255. Id. at 25.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. atl.
Id. at 10 n.29.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001).
Id. at 234.
Angstreich, supra note 106, at 112.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
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This Note now turns to this initial inquiry with

respect to the DOJ interpretive rule.
B. JudicialDeference Is Not Appropriate
1. Seminole Rock and Chevron
The first determination that a court should make when beginning a
Seminole Rock assessment of a regulatory interpretation is whether
the regulation is ambiguous.' If the regulation is clear, the court will
not defer to an interpretation that is inconsistent with the regulation's
plain meaning because such action would result in essentially the
promulgation of a new regulation .2 1 The second determination,
which is usually ignored by the courts, should be whether the
interpretation at issue actually is an interpretationof the regulation,267
or is an amendment disguised as an interpretation.21 Finally, if the
court determines that the interpretation actually is an interpretation,
the court should apply the Seminole Rock "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent" test in order to determine if the interpretation merits
deference. 6 9 If the interpretation does not pass this low bar, there is
no need to invoke Chevron or Skidmore.
The DEA regulation at issue, 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04, clearly is
ambiguous with respect to the meaning of "legitimate medical
purpose" in the context of physician-assisted suicide. Neither the
regulation nor the CSA makes any mention of physician-assisted
suicide, so the first Seminole Rock requirement easily is met." The
second, whether the purported interpretation actually is an
interpretation,is more complicated. Professor Anthony proposes that
courts should look closely at this issue rather than passing
immediately to the "erroneous or inconsistent" test: "there must be a
logical connection between the substantive content of the established
regulation.., and the substantive content of the document that
purports to interpret it, such that the latter flows fairly from and is
justified by the former."'
Under this formulation, a plausible
argument can be made that the Attorney General's directive does not
264. Id. at 74.
265. Id. at 71.

266. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,588 (2000).
267. Anthony, supra note 138, at 6.
268. Angstreich, supra note 106, at 76-77.
269. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945); see supra note
137 and accompanying text.
270. In making this determination, the courts could look to the administrative
history of the regulation to determine whether the regulatory language has clear
meaning, but they generally refuse to do so. Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent:
The Placefor a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51 Hastings LJ. 255, 288-89,

291-92 (2000).
271. Anthony, supra note 138, at 8 (citations omitted).
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logically flow from the regulation and is nothing other than a new
regulation that disguises itself as an interpretation of an existing one.
This point is a difficult one, however, because there is no clear
evidence that the DOJ or the DEA intended to exclude physicianassisted suicide from the "legitimate medical purpose" requirement.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court typically refuses to address this issue
in the first place,272 and there is no indication from the current line of
Seminole Rock cases that the Justices will take up the matter in the
future.273 Since there is no convincing evidence that the Attorney
General's memorandum is not an interpretation, the courts should
treat it as such and proceed to the "plainly erroneous or inconsistent"
analysis.
Even if the regulatory issue were framed in ethical terms, the DOJ's
reading of the regulation still passes muster under Seminole Rock.
The American Medical Association ("AMA") has argued that "the
power to assist in intentionally taking the life of a patient is
antithetical to the central mission of healing that guides both medicine
and nursing."274 Even despite a contrary argument that physicianassisted suicide is a form of "healing," the Attorney General's
interpretation of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 is not clearly inconsistent with
the AMA view that physician-assisted suicide is improper.
Consequently, the DOJ's view that physician-assisted suicide does
not constitute a "legitimate medical purpose" passes the Seminole
Rock test. Notwithstanding Attorney General Reno's contrary
interpretation, 275 the current DOJ interpretation of § 1306.04(a) is not
''plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with the "legitimate medical
purpose" wording of the regulation. The practical consequence of
extending Seminole Rock deference is merely that the court should
respect this interpretation of the regulation as controlling when
applying the Chevron or Skidmore tests.276
2. Skidmore Analysis
As stated above, the CSA is clearly ambiguous with respect to its
"inconsistent with the public interest" standard for the suspension of
physician's licenses. 77 Furthermore, Congress clearly delegated
272. See id. at 7.
273. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,461 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112 (1992);
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S.
864, 872 (1977).
274. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Ass'n et. al. at 5, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110).
275. Reno Letter, supra note 21.
276. See Angstreich, supra note 106, at 73-74.
277. See supra text accompanying note 224. Even in the presence of the five factors
that should inform the Attorney General's decision is unhelpful in clearly resolving
what is meant by "inconsistent with the public interest." The statute does not
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rulemaking authority to the Attorney General.2'
The DOJ
interpretive rule, therefore, easily satisfies Chevron step one. The rule
fails, however, to satisfy the new intermediate Chevron step that arose
2 9
out of Christensen.
1
Because it was not promulgated under
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Ashcroft
Interpretive Rule does not pass the new Chevron step one-and-one
half. Therefore, the analysis switches immediately to Skidmore. The
question now is not one of deference, but of whether the regulation,
as interpreted by DOJ, is a persuasive reading of the statute.
The Ashcroft directive presents a very close Skidmore question. As
Professor Michael Asimow notes, "[A]gencies are often immersed in
administering a particular statute. Such specialization gives those
agencies an intimate knowledge of the problems dealt with in the
statute and the various administrative consequences arising from
particular interpretations."'
Certainly, the DOJ has experience
interpreting the CSA; on the other hand, the DOJ lacks "specialized
expertise" in the medical field. Furthermore, Attorney General
Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA completely contradicts the prior
interpretation of Attorney General Reno, who concluded that "the
CSA does not authorize DEA to prosecute, or to revoke the DEA
registration of, a physician who has assisted in a suicide in compliance
with Oregon law.""8 This factor is one of the tests explicitly stated in
the Skidmore opinion itself, and the DOJ interpretive rule clearly
fails it. In light of these two factors, the courts should find that the
rule lacks persuasiveness and, therefore, need not be afforded more
than slight respect.
Because the Ashcroft directive fails the tests set out in the Seminole
Rock, Chevron, and Skidmore cases, the courts should afford it no
deference and, at most, minor respect. However, even if a court did
decide that the directive was worthy of some degree of respect, the
directive's interpretation of the CSA is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's consistent refusal to allow an agency to interpret a statute in
such a way as to straddle unconstitutionality.2- The next part of this
mention if all the factors have to be answered, or which factors are most important. It
merely lists factors that "shall be considered." 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2000). The
Attorney General could make the argument that physician-assisted suicide, while
compliant with state law and thereby satisfying part of the fourth factor, may fail the
fifth factor as a threat to the public health. See supra note 103.

278. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
279. See supra text accompanying note 261.
280. Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California
Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1157, 1196 (1995).
281. Reno Letter, supra note 21.
282. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

283. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159 (2001); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979);
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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Note examines this doctrine in detail and concludes that the Ashcroft
directive dangerously pushes the Controlled Substances Act toward a
federalism violation that Congress did not intend when it enacted the
statute.
3. Avoidance: The Attorney General Applies the CSA In a
Constitutionally Questionable Manner
In Chevron, the Supreme Court approved the use of canons of
statutory construction to determine Congress' intent with respect to
its statutes.'
According to one well-established canon, if an
interpretation of a statute raises serious constitutional questions,
courts will construe the statute to avoid these questions unless
Congress clearly intended the constitutionally dubious construction.28
This "avoidance" canon should come into play in this case because the
DOJ's interpretation of the CSA "invokes the outer limits of
Congress' power. '" 86 This concern is particularly "heightened where
the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by
permitting a federal encroachment upon a traditional state power." 218
Current Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence stands for
the proposition that Congressional commerce power does not reach
predominantly intrastate activities.m For example, the Court in
United States v. Lopez struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990, 2" holding that a federally regulated activity under the
Commerce Clause must be a commercial or economic endeavor, and
that the activity must substantially affect interstate commerce.29 ° In
United States v. Morrison, the Court struck down the Violence
Against Women Act as beyond Congress's commerce power, despite
284. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 n.9 (1984) ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect.").
285. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172.
286. Id. But see William K. Kelley, Avoiding ConstitutionalProblems as a ThreeBranch Problem, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 831, 881 (2001) (contending that the avoidance
canon results in a judiciary invasion of the executive's Article II authority to execute
the laws); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Gco. L.J.
833, 915 (2001) (arguing that the avoidance canon should not be applied in cases
arising under the Chevron doctrine).
287. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173.
288. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the
Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking
down the Gun Free School Zones Act).
289. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. The Gun Free School Zones Act made knowing
possession of a firearm within a school zone a federal offense. 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(2)(A) (2000).
290. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554-59. Applying this reasoning to the statute, the Court
determined (1) that possession of a firearm is not a commercial activity, and (2) that,
even when viewed cumulatively, handgun possession does not substantially affect
interstate commerce. Id.
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extensive congressional findings that domestic violence substantially
affects commerce.291 Clearly, the Commerce Clause in the hands of
the current Supreme Court has limits.
The echoes of Lopez and Morrison are readily apparent in Solid
Waste Agency, where the Court preserved its restrictions on the
Commerce Clause by refusing to address the question of whether the
Migratory Bird Rule comported with the Commerce Clause.' DOJ's
attempt to use the CSA to prevent Oregon physicians from acting in
accordance with the Death with Dignity Act should suffer the same
fate because DOJ's interpretation of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04, which in
turn interprets the CSA, leads to a potential constitutional problem:
whether physician-assisted suicide affects interstate commerce. The
Court made clear in Lopez that Congress cannot "'use a relatively
trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation
of state or private activities." 93 Instead, the regulated activity must
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. -94
Physician-assisted
suicide under the Death with Dignity Act is an activity that does not
do so. The Death with Dignity Act is available to Oregon residents
only, 95 and the Act mandates that the physicians involved must be
licensed to practice medicine by the Oregon Board of Medical
Examiners.296 These facts alone begin to raise a constitutional
question.
Congress passed the CSA under its Commerce Clause power," and
even though the CSA may regulate the general movement of
controlled substances in interstate commerce, the practice of medicine
has little to do with interstate commerce. As Professor Deborah
Jones Merritt points out, "the more an activity is... traditionally
regulated by the states, the less likely it is to be interstate
commerce."29 The practice of medicine long has been recognized as
just such an area.2 99 Therefore, congressional regulation of intrastate
291. Morrison,529 U.S. at 614.
292. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173 (holding that the Migratory Bird Rule
falls outside of the Commerce Clause limits found in Lopez and Morrison because it
would force the Court to "evaluate the precise object or activity [under the Act] that,
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce"); Louis J. Virelli III &
David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether They Want It or Not": The New Commerce
Clause Doctrine and the Future of FederalCivil Rights Legislation After United States
v. Morrison, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 926, 967 (2001).
293. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
294. Id. at 559.
295. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.805(1) (2001).
296. Id. § 127.800(10).
297. United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d 949, 953 (5th Cir. 1972).
298. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674,746 (1995).
299. See Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5. 18 (1925) (concluding that "direct
control of medical practice in the States is beyond the power of the Federal
Government"); see also Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff's Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347
(2001); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n. 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).
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medical activities at least implicates the "outer limits" of federalism."'
Lopez and Glucksberg show that the Justices should be sensitive to
this issue. In Lopez, Justice Kennedy, in concurrence, complained
that the Gun Free School Zones Act "foreclose[d] the States from
experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which
States lay claim by right of history and expertise." '' Writing for the
Court in Glucksberg," Chief Justice Rehnquist took the same view
with respect to physician-assisted suicide itself: "[T]he States are
currently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of physicianassisted suicide and other similar issues. ' 30 3 Justice O'Connor spoke
even more explicitly of the need to leave such issues to the
"laboratory of the States.'3°4 Therefore, even if not strictly
unconstitutional, the DOJ's interpretation of the relationship between
the CSA and physician-assisted suicide would force the court to
consider whether the prescription of controlled substances to effect
suicide truly is an interstate activity. Under the avoidance canon, the
court should choose not to heed the DOJ's interpretation and instead
construct the CSA not to forbid physician-assistance suicide, just as
Attorney General Janet Reno did in 1998.305
Even the role of the states in prosecuting doctors who violate both
state law and the CSA is at least concurrent with that of the federal
government. In numerous cases that have reached the circuit courts
involving the prosecution of physicians under the CSA, state law
enforcement agents either have taken the lead or have worked
alongside federal agents in investigations to catch rogue physicians
who prescribed excessive amounts of stimulants or depressants to
patients without any medical reason to do so2 6 The Ashcroft
directive disrupts this delicate federal-state balance by attempting to
enforce federal criminal law over state criminal law in a subject area
that has no relation to commerce, an action that triggered the
avoidance canon in United States v. Bass. 7 In order for this move to
survive under Solid Waste Agency, clear congressional intent would be
required.

300. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
301. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
302. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
303. Id. at 719.
304. Id. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
305. See Reno Letter, supra note 21. Attorney General Reno's reading is
important because it demonstrates that there is another interpretation of the CSA
with respect to physician-assisted suicide that is just as valid as DOJ's current
interpretation. Therefore, 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) is "open tO a construction" that
avoids the constitutionally-questionable interpretation. See Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,578 (1988).
306. See, e.g., United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1186 (4th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1148 (2d Cir. 1986).
307. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
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The legislative history of the CSA demonstrates that Congress did
not intend for the CSA to bring about the federalism problems
outlined above. According to the legislative history, the target of the
CSA was drug abuse,' and Congress noted that the CSA "combines
both the punitive and rehabilitive [sic] approaches to the problem of
drug abuse."3' 9 Most importantly, Congress noted that "[s]ince drug
abuse involves illegal activities under both State and Federal law,
reliable statistics cannot be obtained on the actual extent of drug
abuse in the United States. 310 Congress, therefore, contemplated that
the CSA would target an activity that was illegal under both federal
and state law. This statement hardly can be said to demonstrate
Congress's desire to pre-empt intrastate activities. In fact, quite the
opposite is true because the CSA presents itself as working in tandem
with state law.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's demand for clear and convincing
evidence that Congress intended its statute to reach the outer limits of
constitutionality-in this case, a disturbance of the federal-state
balance and serious commerce clause questions-clearly is not met
here. In fact, the legislative history leads to the opposite conclusion:
Congress contemplated concurrent state and federal regulation of the
drug trade when it passed the CSA. Therefore, the Ashcroft directive,
even if eligible for Chevron deference, should trigger the avoidance
canon. In order to avoid federalism issues, the courts should return to
Attorney General Janet Reno's interpretation from 1998 and construe
the CSA as not forbidding physicians from complying with state laws
permitting physician-assisted suicide."'
CONCLUSION

The Founders understood that federalism was the safeguard of
liberty; consequently, they granted the federal government only the
powers enumerated in the Constitution and reserved the remaining
powers for the states, and for themselves.
The long history of the
308. In the legislative history, Congress claimed that '[d]rug abuse in the United
States is a problem of ever-increasing concern, and appears to be approaching
epidemic proportions." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, at 6 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,4572.
309. Id. at 8, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4574. According to a report of the
President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, which was known as
the "Prettyman Commission," the fight against drug abuse encompassed three goals:
(1) attacking illegal drug trafficking; (2) rehabilitating individual drug abusers and
eliminating the causes of drug abuse; and (3) penalizing small-time dealers and users,
but with an emphasis on rehabilitation. Id. at 9-10, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4575.
310. Id. at 7, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4572 (emphasis added).
311. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
312. Robert W. Scheef, Note, "Public Citizens" and the Constitution: Bridging the
Gap Between Popular Sovereignty and OriginalIntent, 69 Fordham. L Rev. 2201,
2228 (2001).
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Death with Dignity Act in Oregon is a clear demonstration of how the
people in one state carried out this ideal and made a collective
decision regarding a profound moral issue. If the Supreme Court's
decision in Washington v. Glucksberg313 stands for anything, it stands
for the proposition that the federal government should not disturb a
state's use of its reserved powers to resolve this issue, and that the
ultimate choice in the matter is left, through the democratic process,
to the people. Oregonians have spoken. The federal government
must not silence them.

313. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).

